Human good in accordance with Excellence

In Book I, chapter seven of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes an argument for human good being a life of reason: including activities in accordance with human excellence. He uses three fundamental steps to make this argument: first, Aristotle gives an account of the good and what it is. Next, he defines the function of man, for this helps clarify what the good is. Finally, he explains how the function of man relates to the good, and why his argument for a life of reason is correct. I will mirror these steps: describing Aristotle’s account of the good, the function of man, and finally explaining how the function of man is related to the good. 

Aristotle’s account of the good begins by stating what the good is, and acknowledges that there are many different goods. Next, he addresses incomplete and complete ends. Finally, Aristotle defines the most complete of all ends: happiness. I will address these topics as well: describing each of these points and their use in the overarching argument for the human good. 

The good is the end for which all things are done (1097a, 20). Every action has an end, and the end of that action is the good. The good defines the proper goal of everything. It is important to note that every end requires an action. You cannot achieve an end or the good without an action to move you from the proposed idea to an end. The good of an action cannot be reached without first doing the action. For instance, you cannot achieve music without playing an instrument: music being the end, and the playing of the instrument the action. According to Aristotle, there are also many different goods. In sharp contrast to Plato, Aristotle does not perceive the Form of the Good as the end of all things. Rather, every action has its own individual good. For instance, the good of medicine is health, strategy victory, and architecture a house (1097a, 20). In each of these cases, an action is required to move from the inconclusive idea to the concrete end result. 

The idea of complete and incomplete ends is vital to the continuation of this idea of ends and goods, and is a large part of what sets Aristotle’s conception of the good apart from Plato’s. According to Aristotle, an incomplete end is an end that is accomplished for the achievement of something else (1097a, 25). For instance, you desire wealth (the end of wage-earning) in order to to buy food and other necessities or luxuries. You do not desire wealth for the sake of wealth. An incomplete end defines one good among many: many actions are taken for many different goods, and each of these goods is aimed towards the achievement of a greater good. 

Opposite this idea of incomplete ends, complete ends are those ends that are desired for themselves in and of themselves: a complete end is “desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else” (1097a, 30). A complete end is independent of any other end. To be more precise, the more worthy something is of pursuit in and of itself rather than for some other end, the more complete it is. In other words, the more desirable something is for itself, the more complete an end it is (1097a, 30). In the definition of incomplete ends, I used wealth as an example of an incomplete end, for we use it to gain another end: the procurement of goods. If, however, wealth were a complete end, we would desire wealth for the sake of wealth and wealth alone. We would desire all the wealth imaginable, but not wish to do anything with it. We would simply want to posses endless wealth without any further purpose. A complete end describes a good that is desired for itself and nothing else. It is possible that there may be more than one complete end, and therefore more than one final good, but to be truly complete, it seems that there must be only one complete end. This will become important when describing the most complete of all ends: the chief good. 

Aristotle states that we are seeking the most complete end of all complete ends, if we assume that more than one complete end exists (1097a, 30). Why Aristotle qualifies the statement with this idea of multiple complete ends is unclear, for he certainly seems to think only one true complete end exists. However, this does not affect the argument in any way, for in any case, we are looking for the most complete of complete ends (the complete end that includes all the lesser complete ends). This final complete end must be self-sufficient, meaning that which when “isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing” (1097b, 15). This ultimate end, according to Aristotle, is considered happiness. We desire happiness because the possession of it makes us happy, and it is the ultimate end of every end. Happiness is not desired because it will help us achieve any other end: we do not desire happiness because it will bring us more wealth. We desire wealth because it may bring us happiness. In all things, the goal is to increase our happiness through the achievement of the end of the action. Ultimately, we do things because they make us happy. Happiness is “complete and self-sufficient, and is the end of action” (1097b, 20). 

I have just described Aristotle’s account of what the good is, what incomplete and complete ends are, and why happiness is the chief good. These definitions and the account of the good will help define the function of man and how that function relates to the good. I will first discuss why we need to know the function of things in order to know if those things are good. This will include the need to define the function of man (and why man must have a function), and why man has a unique function apart from other living things. I will then address what exactly that function is, and the two major components of man’s function. 

Aristotle believes that we must define the function of man in order to more clearly define the good, for the good “is thought to reside in the function” (1097b, 25). What is good about a given thing is present in its function because without the real use of the thing, it is impossible to know if something is good. Aristotle references “a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist” (1097b, 25), for the argument for the good residing in function can perhaps be best illustrated through examples. A flute-player plays the flute: a good flute-player plays the flute well. A good sculptor sculpts well. The function of an eye is to see: a good eye sees well. The function of the thing, and whether it is well done, determines whether or not the thing itself is good. In other words, if you know what a thing is supposed to do (what its apparent function is), you know what it should do well. For instance, a knife’s function is to cut: a good knife is sharp. A dull knife may still cut, and fulfill its function as a thing that cuts, but it will cut only soft objects, and will cut them uncleanly and with great effort. A dull knife therefore will not be called a good knife. A sharp knife will cut quickly and cleanly: it fulfills its function as something that cuts, and also does so well. A sharp knife, therefore, will be called a good knife. It fulfills its function, and it carries out its function well. Therefore, a good thing is defined as that which fulfills its given function well. 

Now that we have established why the good resides in the function of a thing, we must determine the function of man, for we are obviously interested in the good as it relates to man rather than any any other creature or object. It is therefore very important to determine what unique quality man has apart from everything else. Aristotle’s first statement is that man must have a function, for if carpenters and tanners have functions, why wouldn’t man? If eyes, ears, limbs, and all the parts of man have functions, man must also have one, and that function must be apart from the the parts that compose man (1097b, 30). Just as an arm consists of fingers to touch and hold, a hand to grasp, an elbow to bend, bicep to lift, and so on; a man consists of his individual parts. But just as an arm does not have the same function as a hand, or a finger, an elbow, or a bicep individually; neither does a man have the same function as his eye or his leg. The interaction of the parts of an arm help determine the function of an arm, so perhaps the interaction of the parts of man can help determine his function. 

We have confirmed that the function of a thing is not simply drawn from the individual functions of its parts, so the function of man is not simply drawn from the parts of man. But the parts and their interactions are related to the function of the thing, and so must be considered in determining the function of man. Therefore, Aristotle first considers life as a function in terms of growth and nutrition (1098a, 1). This would mean that the function of man is to grow and take in nutrients (to live: in the most basic sense of the word). Obviously, this function is not unique to man: plants and animals also possess life in these terms. It therefore seems that growth and nutrition are the function of the purely physical body or form. Physical digestive systems, growth plates, limbs, and organs determine growth and nutrition in all forms of life. Growth and nutrition cannot be unique functions of man. Aristotle next questions that which is more unique than life: perception. Men perceive the world around them. But, as in the case of life, perception is not unique to man. Perception is “common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal” (1098a, 1), for every animal (including man) uses senses to interact with the world around them. The senses of sight, hearing, touch, and so on are not unique in any way to man. Every animal possesses these senses, and though the relative abilities differ (for dogs possess a highly developed sense of smell, and so on), they are all used in the same fundamental ways. 

What function, then, is singularly unique to man and defines his function? Aristotle concludes that this function is “an active life of the element that has a rational principle” (1098a, 1). Aristotle thinks that this is the quality that sets men apart from any other lifeform: the ability to think rationally. Rather than reacting instinctually or in direct response to stimuli, as an animal would, Aristotle is stating here that men can think beyond their immediate needs and desires, and understand why they are doing the things they are doing, choose to do those things, and decide in what fashion they wish to do them. This life with a rational element (1098a, 1)is composed of two parts: the first being obedience to a rational principle, and second the possession of a rational principle and utilization of thought. 

The first part of this life consists of obedience to a rational principle. There is a system in place based upon reason and a given rational principle which governs the way man thinks about and reacts to the world around him. The presence of this rational principle in life does not mean anything unless man obeys it. The function of man cannot consist of “an active life of the element that has a rational principle (1098a, 1) if man does not accept that rational principle and obey it. If man can be shown to go against or otherwise deny the rational principle, it can be shown that this type of life is not the function of man. It is possible that this rational principle exists for animals also, but they do not fulfill the second part of the definition of this type of life. 

The second part: the possession of a rational principle and utilization of thought, ties into the first part, for if there is a rational principle, it is essential that man possess that rational principle, and utilize the rational principle through thought. This second part of the definition of this life is what truly sets man apart from animals. To fulfill his function, man must possess the rational principle, for if he does not possess it, he cannot obey it, mad if he does not obey it, it is impossible for the rational principle to define the unique function of man. Man must own the rational principle and understand it as intimately as he understands his most precious possessions. Man must use the rational principle at all times, and he must utilize the rational principle through thinking and problem solving. Utilization of the rational principle through thought defines the actions of men: and therefore the unique function of man. The rational principle, and the utilization of it, is what defines higher intelligence. The ability to plan in advance, strategize, philosophize, theorize, and carry out rational actions based upon non-sensory input is what defines a life involving the rational principle. Animals do not fulfill this requirement, for they do not think beyond their immediate sensory needs and desires. Man must fulfill the three requirements of a life involving the rational principle. First, he must accept and obey reason and the rational principle. Second, he must possess that rational principle and make it his own. Third, man must use the rational principle to determine his actions through rational thought. By doing these things, man will act in accordance with the rational principle. As shown earlier, the action is required for every end and every function. Neither can be achieved without the action having been taken first. Once the action has been taken (such as cutting), we can discern the theoretical function of the thing acting (the function of a knife being to cut), and based upon the result of the action we can discern whether or not the thing is good (a good knife is one that cuts well). Therefore, if man acts in a rational way, or in a way otherwise in accordance with the rational principle, we can state that “the function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with, or not without, rational principle” (1098a, 5). 

I have just defined the function of man by showing that reason and the ability to posses and exercise thought are qualities unique to man, if he acts in accordance with a rational principle. The element of life that possesses rational principle is singularly human (1098a, 5). I will now use Aristotle’s argument to show how the the function of man (activity of the soul in accordance with rational principle) is related to the good, and why Aristotle’s original argument for human good as the activity of the soul in accordance with excellence is correct and logical. I will begin by defining the function of a good man, before showing how that relates to the conclusion of Aristotle’s argument. 

Aristotle bridges the gap between a man and a good man with a very simple transitive argument: anything that has a function has the same function as the ‘good’ thing: “a so-and-so and a good so-and-so have a function which is the same in kind” (1098a, 5). The difference is that the good version carries out the function better than the non-qualified version. For instance, the end of a carpenter and a good carpenter may be construction: it doesn’t matter if the carpenter in question is good, bad, or somewhere in between. The difference is that a good carpenter does the job better: a good carpenter is better at construction. The aim and function is the same, but the end result of the action has a different quality. Therefore, if we are looking for the most complete end, or the chief good (1097a, 30), then we must be looking for the best version of everything. In the case of man, then, we are in search of what the function of a good man is. According to Aristotle, this function is “the good and noble performance” of “actions of the soul implying a rational principle” (1098a, 10). A good man, to Aristotle, is one that is good at applying the unique function of man: thought and actions related to reason. 

According to Aristotle, an action “is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence” (1098a, 10). Therefore, in the argument of man, the qualifier “eminence in respect to excellence” is added to the description of man’s function in order to describe the good man, and from here onwards we will discuss the ‘good’ man (1098a, 10) in agreement with the goal of defining the most complete version of the chief good. Remembering that the most current definition of the function of man we have discussed thus far is the “activity of soul in accordance with, or not without, rational principle” (1098a, 5), it is not difficult to modify the function of man to agree with the new idea of excellence in relation to function. Therefore, the final definition of the function of man turns out to be that “human goodness turns out to be an activity of soul in conformity with excellence” (1098a, 15) of the rational principle over the course of a complete life. The qualifier of a complete life is critically important, for a single instance does not define a man, nor the function of man. It is the persistent use of excellence in relation to reason that makes a good man, and which is most indicative of the chief good. 

I have just shown how Aristotle transitions from the original definition of the function of man as “an activity of soul in accordance with, or not without, rational principle” (1098a, 5) to the intermediate stage of a good man’s function being “the good and noble performance” of “actions of the soul implying a rational principle” (1098a, 10), to the final definition of the function of man as and “activity of soul in conformity with excellence” (1098a, 15) of the rational principle over the course of a complete life. This final definition of the function of man brings us back to the original argument: that human good is a life of reason involving activity in accordance with human excellence. 

In this paper, I have done three things: I have described Aristotle’s account of the good in terms of complete and incomplete ends, and the chief good: happiness. I applied this account of the good to the definition of the function of man to determine that “the function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with, or not without, rational principle” (1098a, 5). I then used Aristotle’s argument for the pursuit of the best of all things to show why the definition of a good man is the good or noble pursuit of actions involving the rational principle, and I further used this argument to show that the ultimate function of man is a life of reason full of actions in accordance with excellence.