Socrates’ Rejection of Care for the Gods as Piety

At line 12e of the Euthyphro, Euthyphro asserts that “the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods.” In this paper I will show that Socrates finds this definition problematic for two reasons. The first overarching reason is the effects of caring for something. This reason is separated into the question of whether humans can improve the gods, and a rejection of Euthyphro’s argument that humans can serve the gods as a slave serves a master. I will also show that Socrates’ rejection of this definition of piety serves to end the Euthyphro dialogue by destroying Euthyphro’s argument and proving that Euthyphro has no true knowledge of the definition of piety.

Socrates’ argument against Euthyphro’s position (that piety is caring for the gods) stems from the basic act of caring for something. The problem with Euthyphro’s argument is where he relates it to humans and their care of the gods. Socrates makes three main points under this broad argument. First, he notes that caring for something usually improves the thing cared for. Next, he provides an answer to the question of how humans can improve the gods. Finally, he ponders what the gods accomplish through our pious actions.

Socrates’ first and overarching concern with Euthyphro’s belief is that Euthyphro seems to be asserting that we care for the gods in much the same way as a horse breeder or hunter cares for horses and dogs (13a). The problem with this is that horse breeders and hunters improve the lives of horses and dogs. A horse breeder or a hunter provides attention that allows a horse or a dog to live better than it otherwise could. More generally, the caregiver elevates the thing cared for to a level it could not otherwise attain. The caregiver makes the thing cared for better than the thing could naturally be on its own. Socrates assumes that Euthyphro does not “mean the care of the gods in the same sense as the care of other things” (13a), but Euthyphro assures him that he does mean it that way. This leads Socrates to the conclusion that by caring for the gods, humans are improving them in some way. This is an immediate problem for Socrates and Euthyphro, who exclaims “by Zeus, no” (13c) he does not mean to say that “when you do something pious you make some one of the gods better” (13c). Though the line of reasoning he confirmed as correct (the idea of horses and horse breeders) is what led to this conclusion, he cannot accept the conclusion as true. If this were true, that humans do something for the gods that they could not do themselves, it would undermine the power of the gods and elevate humans. As a priest, Euthyphro cannot agree to the idea of humans making the gods better in a way they could not improve themselves.

Socrates’ second counterpoint to Euthyphro’s argument addresses the issue of humans improving the gods. Socrates bluntly asks Euthyphro, “is piety...to benefit the gods and make them better?” (13c), to which Euthyphro responds that what he means is a relationship between humans and the gods similar to the relationship of slaves and masters. In this relationship, humans provide “the kind of care...that slaves take of their masters” (13d) to the gods, and in return, there is “no good that we do not receive from them” (15a). What this means is that we do not actually improve the gods, but do them a service that helps them in return for the blessings we receive. “The many fine things that the gods achieve” (14a) are accomplished “using us as their servants” (13e). The distinction between improving and providing a service for the gods is that in the first case we do something that they could not otherwise do themselves (improve them as a hunter and dogs), while in the second case we are doing something that is good for the gods, but that they could do themselves (as a slave and his master).

Slightly modifying Socrates’ example of the horse breeder and horses (13a) and Euthyphro’s example of slaves and masters (13d) can provide a very good illustration of Socrates’ second point. A horse breeder cares for horses by feeding them, among other activities. By feeding the horses, the horse breeder accomplishes something that the horses could not do on their own: they are able to live in a confined space in large numbers. Without the horse breeder to feed them and care for them, the horses would starve or succumb to disease, provided all other variables remained constant. If the relationship of humans to the gods were the same as that of horses and horse breeders, it would stand to reason that our pious actions accomplish something positive for the gods that would otherwise be impossible for them to achieve. In the second scenario (where humans are slaves and the gods their masters), however, we can see that the problem with the first example is no longer an issue. A slave does nothing that the master could not do himself. For instance, if a slave runs errands for his master, the master may pursue other activities in the mean time, or simply save the money that it would cost to hire a courier. In either case, the master could do the thing, but the slave makes it easier without changing the parameters of the situation.

I have just shown that if humans are slaves and gods the masters, the validity of the argument seems to remain intact. If humans care for the gods as slaves care for their masters, then we simply make the gods lives easier. In this case, we do nothing the gods could not accomplish themselves if they chose. Now I will address Socrates’ third counterpoint, which refutes this seemingly valid example.

Socrates’ issue with the slave-master relationship is the question of what do the gods accomplish through us? “What is that excellent aim that the gods achieve, using us as their servants?” (13e). Socrates’ argument circles back to the issue of improving the gods’ through our actions, leading Euthyphro to ask if Socrates thinks “that the gods are benefitted by what they receive from us” (15a). Euthyphro suggests that perhaps what we do for the gods is not a material action, but “honor, reverence...” (15a), which leads Socrates to conclude that piety is what pleases the gods, though it holds no beneficial value for them. In this case, piety is “pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them” (15b). Therefore, even though the example of the slave-master relationship is valid in its own parameters, it is invalidated by Socrates’ assertion, and Euthyphro’s agreement, that humans simply cannot provide anything beneficial to the gods (15b). Euthyphro’s statement of the pious being dear to the gods circles back to the argument earlier in the Euthyphro dialogue about “the pious is...what is dear to the gods” (15b).

In that argument, Euthyphro, maintains that “what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious” (7a). Socrates questions this statement, for he and Euthyphro have already stated that “the gods are in a state of discord [and] that they are at odds with each other” (7b). If you put those two statements together, you arrive, as Socrates does, at the conclusion that “different gods consider different things to be [pious], for they would not be at odds with one another unless they differed about [this] subject” (7e). This idea results in a paradox of something being pious to one god, but impious to another (8a). Socrates continues to question Euthyphro, and they arrive at a new but related definition of piety: “that the pious is being loved [because] it is pious, but it is not pious because it is being loved” (10e). The reasoning here is that if it cannot be pious because it is loved by the gods (as in the previous definition), then it must be loved by the gods because it is pious. This claim seems to make sense, until Socrates reminds Euthyphro that if this is the case, then “the pious has the quality of being loved by all the gods, but you have not yet told me what the pious is” (11a-b). It may be true that the gods love pious things because they are pious, but even if that is the case, that doesn’t tell us what is pious because we don’t know what the gods love. This also relates back to Socrates’ proof that piety is not what is dear to the gods, because the gods do not agree on what is good (7e). Therefore, if the gods cannot agree on what is good, it follows that they do not love the same things. If the gods love things that are pious, but do not love the same things, then we have hit a problem with the argument.

These two proofs effectively render these two definitions of piety useless. If the gods cannot agree on what is dear to them and loved by them, then what is pious is obviously not pious because is dear to the gods or loved by the gods. That which is pious is not pious because it is dear to the gods. And that which is loved by the gods is not god-loved because it is pious.

I have addressed the first major point of this paper: Socrates’ issue with the act of caring for something. The second point of this paper is to explain what Socrates’ rejection of the definition of piety as “the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods” (12e) means for the Euthyphro dialogue as a whole. The conclusion of Socrates’ third counterpoint to the definition of piety as “what is dear to the gods is the pious” (15c) is the basis of the repercussions of Socrates’ rejection in the dialogue. Socrates quickly disproves Euthyphro’s first definition of piety, that “what is dear to the gods is pious, what is not is impious” (7a), by showing that “different gods consider different things to be just, ...good, and bad” (7e). Therefore, it follows that if the gods cannot agree on what is good and bad, then many things would be “both pious and impious” (8a) at the same time: a contradiction which finishes the discussion of piety as that which is dear to the gods.

The reversion to former definitions of piety, that what is dear to the gods is pious and that which is pious is god-loved, dismantles Euthyphro’s entire argument. He has come to the same incorrect conclusion as before, but through a different line of reasoning. As with many of the Socratic dialogues, this circling back to a previous definition shows that Euthyphro truly has nothing more to say about the topic, for “whatever proposition [they] put forward goes around and refuses to stay where [they] establish it” (11b). There is no further argument he can make, for no matter what he does, he is going to end up at the same conclusion as one of his other faulty definitions. It is seemingly impossible for Euthyphro to come up with a definition of piety that does not conflict with an earlier claim that Socrates has already disproved. They have examined piety in every way that Euthyphro can think of, and every time he thinks he has a new idea, Socrates disproves it. This shows that Euthyphro does not truly know anything about what defines piety, for he cannot come up with even the beginning of a true definition of it. Therefore, Euthyphro is not the authority on the gods that he claimed to be at the beginning of the dialogue (5a, 6b). Shortly after Socrates disproves Euthyphro’s definition of piety as ‘care of the gods,’ Euthyphro simply abandons his conversation with Socrates, claiming that he is “in a hurry...and it is time for [him] to go” (15e). Socrates’ rejection of the ‘care of the gods’ definition of piety utterly destroys Euthyphro’s final argument and brings his earlier arguments back into play, showing them to be false as well. This ensures the end of the Euthyphro dialogue.

In this paper I have shown that Socrates rejects Euthyphro’s definition of piety as “the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods “ (12e) because humans cannot improve the gods by caring for them, and furthermore I have disproved Euthyphro’s assertion that humans can serve the gods as slaves serve masters. I have also shown that Socrates’ rejection and disproval of this definition of piety serves to end the Euthyphro by completely destroying Euthyphro’s argument and showing that Euthyphro has no true knowledge of the nature of piety.